Social autonomy and heteronomy in the age of ICT. The digital pharmakon and the (dis)empowerment of the general intellect by Lemmens, P.C.






The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 










‘Social autonomy and heteronomy in the age of ICT. The digital pharmakon 




Paper for ‘The Art of Living with ICT’ symposium, Brussels, 25 april 2014 
 
In this talk, I want to explore the question of how the new digital network technologies (DNTs) 
can help increase the social autonomy of workers and citizens with respect to the machinations of 
capital in the current conjuncture of cognitive and consumerist capitalism and how they can be 
employed to fight against the overwhelmingly heteronomizing effects that these technologies 
have shown to possess over the last few decades, a loud choir of ideological proponents of a 
bright digital utopia notwithstanding. In other words I want to explore how these technologies 
can foster the empowerment of what is called the ‘general intellect’ in the Italian post-Marxist 
movement of post-autonomism or post-operaism, one of the most vital movements of Marxist 
thought in recent times and one to which I am very sympathetic, I have to admit from the very 
outset. Although this tradition of thinkers, whose ranks include Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, 
Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato and Franco Berardi, is explicitly concerned, among other, 
things with studying the shifting relationships between technological change on the one side and 
the class struggle of workers against capital and vice versa on the other, what is generally absent 
in their analyses is an explicit account of technology and the various ways it mediates, constitutes 
and conditions social relationships and relations to self. In short, it lacks an explicit philosophy of 
technology. In this talk, therefore, I will try to use Bernard Stiegler’s so-called pharmacological 
conception of technology (a view that shares certain similarities with Andrew Feenberg’s idea of 
technical ambivalence) and see how it can be used to elaborate and enrich the analyses of today’s 
general intellect by the operaist-autonomist tradition, which always revolve around the issue of 
recomposition or the empowerment of the general intellect as the process of collective political 
subjectivation of workers. For lack of time, however, I will only give some suggestions in that 
direction. 
 
Let me first explain the notion of cognitive capitalism. Cognitive capitalism, a term coined by the 
French post-operaist economist Yann Moulier-Boutang, is the current mode of capitalism in 
which not labor power but cognitive and affective capacities are the crucial determinants of 
productivity and the main sources of surplus value. It is a kind of capitalism that thrives on the 
exploitation of cognition, attention, affection and what Moulier-Boutang calls attention-power 
and invention-power. It involves the capturing of monetary gains from knowledge production and 
innovation by a collective intelligence or a general intellect described by Lazzarato in terms of 
‘cooperation between brains’. Using the metaphor of bees, Moulier-Boutang writes that the 
wealth produced under cognitive capitalism derives from the constant ‘pollination’ of society by 
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the multitudes on the wings of the digital networks (p. 108). Cognitive capitalism submits 
cognition to the economic imperatives of profit maximization and competition, and replaces 
industrial capitalism, which was based on the exploitation of labor power as muscular capacity. 
In the context of cognitive capitalism, and as a result of the deployment of DNTs, the human 
cognitive system is increasingly incorporated into the digital cognosphere.  
 
One of the central concepts within post-autonomist discourse, rediscovered from the famous 
‘Fragment on machines’ in Karl Marx’ Grundrisse and reinterpreted in the context of today’s 
cognitive capitalism, is that of the general intellect. Marx uses this notion of the general intellect 
in the Grundrisse only once, to designate the objectified labor incorporated in machines or as the 
power of knowledge and science, incarnated in machines as dead labor or as fixed capital 
subsuming and controlling variable capital or living labor. For Marx, the notion of general 
intellect refers to the system of machinery as the scientifically objectified power of labor that is 
transformed as such into the power of capital. In the machinery of industrial capitalism, the 
laborers’ knowledge appears as something alien and external to him and living labor appears as 
subsumed under self-activating objectified labor. As Marx writes: ‘It belongs to the concept of 
capital that the increased productive force of labor is posited rather as the increase of a force 
outside itself, and as labor’s own debilitation’. This debilitation of labor, an expression that was 
used already by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, designates what is more familiar within 
Marxist discourse under the name of proletarianization, the process that produces the proletariat 
that is hailed as the emerging revolutionary subject of history in the Communist Manifesto.  
 
In post-autonomism, however, the concept of the general intellect is understood quite differently, 
not as external machinery opposing living labor as fixed capital but as fixed capital inside living 
labor, i.e., as an attribute of living labor. In cognitive capitalism, the general intellect comes to 
refer to the information, the communication, the languages, codes, skills and competences of the 
immaterial laborers. As Antonio Negri emphasizes, cognitive capitalism’s labor force carries its 
means of production once again insie itself, in its brains. It is fixed capital residing in the nervous 
systems of living labor and is referred to in the human resource departments of companies and 
public institutions as ‘human capital’. According to Negri and many other post-autonomists, this 
general intellect as the fixed capital residing in human brains grants labor a relative yet increasing 
independence with respect to capital and allows it a growing margin of autonomy. It would also 
represent a break with the process of proletarianization, since it involves a certain reappropriation 
of the means of production by labor, thereby putting an end to the dialectics of the instrument of 
labor first theorized by Hegel. As will be shown, however, this assertion is highly doubtful. 
 
Post-autonomists generally applaud the digital revolution and the chances it provides for the 
struggle of labor against capitalist domination.  Moulier-Boutang and Hardt and Negri, in 
particular in their Empire trilogy, affirm that DNTs are ultimately favorable to the expansion of 
the autonomy of the multitude vis à vis capital, although they enable new and highly effective 
forms of labor control as well. Both labor and capital have to operate under the network condition 
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today, the digital networks providing the matrix for both the new figure of sovereignty known as 
empire and of immaterial production by the multitude, the living prey and alternative to empire. 
For Hardt and Negri, given its globally networked condition, the multitude as the assemblage of 
singularities forming the new proletariat is principally capable of self-rule and autonomy, since it 
is able to produce its own means of production (that is to say: cooperation and communication as 
the substance of the common) all by itself, independent of capital. In fact, they suggest that the 
immaterial production and decision-making via DNTs by the multitude provides the model for a 
genuine multitudinous and absolute democracy. So, for Hardt and Negri, DNTs are ultimately 
empowering and autonomizing, providing, in principle, the socio-technological condition for a 
global radical democracy as the self-rule and self-management of the multitude. 
 
A much more critical, if not outright pessimistic diagnosis of the potential of DNTs can be found 
in the work of Jodi Dean, who does not belong to the post-autonomist tradition but who is 
sympathetic to the communist cause and largely subscribes to Hardt and Negri’s analysis of the 
common. Dean perceives the DNTs from the angle of what she calls ‘communicative capitalism’, 
a current form of capitalism based on the commodification, control and exploitation of 
communication. Think Google, Facebook and Yahoo. According to Dean, today’s digital 
networks entrap users in circuits of enjoyment, production and surveillance in which they 
voluntarily and frenetically engage. Inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis, or its updated version 
by Slavoj Zizek, she conceives of digital networks as affective networks that capture their users 
in repetitive and addictive loops of drive and self-centered reflexivity. Communication and 
participation on the Internet is anything but emancipatory and does not aid democratization in 
any useful way. Instead, it reinforces the domination of capitalism and frustrates the formation of 
collective desire, promoting ego-centered and individualistic, capitalist desires instead. Digital 
networks absorb the attention and the critical energy of those participating in it, distracting and 
fragmenting it, thereby depoliticizing subjects. They atomize and individualize subjects and 
prevent the formation of solidarity and feelings of community. They are also proletarianizing and 
expropriating, deskilling us and robbing us from our collectively produced knowledges and 
codes. Also, by constantly capturing and exploiting our attention, they exhaust users’ cognitive 
and affective potentials and systematically impede their engagement in the real politics of 
organizing, protesting and confronting the powers that be head-on. For Dean, it seems clear, 
DNTs are ultimately disempowering and heteronomizing. The big political question, in her eyes, 
is how to escape from our capture in these affective networks of drive and to create the conditions 
for the formation of a collective desire, a desire for communism, for a ‘communicative 
communism’ as it were. It is important to note that for Dean, desire and affectivity are crucial for 
thinking about the possibility of emancipation and liberation in the age of digital ICTs. This 
emphasis on the libidinal and the affective is also apparent in the analyses of DNTs in the work 
of Franco Berardi and Bernard Stiegler, to whom I will turn now. 
 
In stark contrast to Hardt and Negri, Berardi fails to perceive the emancipatory potential of 
DNTs. His diagnosis is much closer to that of Dean and, as we will see, to that of Stiegler. His 
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term for the contemporary form of capitalism is semiocapitalism: a capitalism thriving on the 
exploitation of linguistic, symbolic and cognitive, that is to say sign-producing or semiotic labor. 
Like Dean, but more focused on cognitive production than communication, Berardi points to the 
fact that cognitive or immaterial labor, far from gaining more and more autonomy with respect to 
capital, is becoming increasingly captured and controlled inside the digital networks, through the 
implementation of what he calls technical and financial automatisms operating according to the 
logic of competition and surplus extraction and engendering more and more psychological and 
social automatisms. What he sees emerging in the context of cognitive capitalism is an increasing 
integration of the human mind into the digital circuits of capital, the organic nervous systems of 
the cognitariat more and more incorporated into and submitted to the operational logics and 
rhythms of the digital nervous system, shaping a genuine ‘assembly line of net-production’. The 
cognitariat’s consciousnesses are exposed to an ever more expanding and accelerating cogno- and 
infosphere, a situation that leads to a growing discrepancy between cyberspace, the ever growing 
and virtually infinite mass of semiotic and informational commodities circulating on the net, and 
cybertime, the finite mental time necessary for processing and elaborating this information. This 
discrepancy induces all kinds of psychopathologies – like depression, anxiety, panic and attention 
disorders of all kinds – and leads to the exhaustion and ultimately destruction of psychic and 
mental energies. It erodes subject’s sensibility and affectivity due to the constant pressure to 
adapt one’s psychic apparatus to the codes and rhythms of the network. Moreover, the constant 
mobilization of attention as well as the fractalization and fragmentation of workers’ time prevents 
the formation of collectivity and solidarity as a necessary basis for effective resistance and action 
against the domination of capital. It is due to these paralyzing and sterilizing labor conditions, 
Berardi claims, that the political recomposition of the general intellect, and the possibilities for 
political subjectivation and the creation of solidarity, is systematically frustrated. The necessity of 
always ‘being connected’ for participating in cognitive production supposes the adjustment of 
one’s psychic apparatus to the codes, the logic, the speed and the rhythm of the infosphere and 
engenders the loss of reflexivity and the erosion of sensibility and receptiveness. A central theme 
in the admittedly quite gloomy analyses of Berardi is that of the exhaustion of libidinal energies 
as a defining dimension of contemporary cognitive labor, a theme that also runs through the work 
of Stiegler as we will see. The minds of the cognitarians, glued to demanding screens from the 
morning until the evening, are more and more disconnected from their bodies as well as from the 
social body. Berardi states that it cannot be denied that the intellectual capacity of today’s general 
intellect is potentially boundless, and here he is in agreement with Hardt and Negri and Moulier-
Boutang, but that it currently lacks any consciousness of itself. The creation of such a self-
consciousness is precisely the emancipatory political task of the future.  
 
Berardi’s work is important in that it shows that transformation in the techno-cognitive 
environment change the conditions for political subjectivation and redefine the possibilities as 
well as the limits for collective struggle. However, he only seems to perceive the negative side of 
current transformations. For him, the big political question is how to create a  self-consciousness 
of the general intellect so as to gain a common ground of understanding for collective action that 
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can be effective and truly autonomizing. His suggestion is that the kind of politics necessary for 
such a task of commonization and autonomization should have the character of a therapy and not 
of political resistance and action in the traditional, say Leninist sense of the term, which would 
only deepen our exhaustion and depression. An effective and vitalizing future emancipatory 
politics should concern itself instead with re-directing the social investments of desire, from the 
pathogenic investment in competition, accumulation and work to an investment in community, 
friendship and love. Thus, for Berardi as well, desire and affect are crucial. Important to note here 
is that Berardi conceives of desire not anymore as a force that is inherently emancipatory but, 
inspired by Baudrillard, as a field upon which conflicting forces intersect, principally mediated 
by technology. The problem with Berardi, however, a problem similar to that of Dean, is that no 
effort is made of developing a strategy for confronting and dealing with the diagnosed situation in 
terms of that situation itself, i.e., on the terrain of DNTs, the inevitable condition for political 
engagement in our time. Both Dean and Berardi keep silent, or so it seems, when it comes to the 
question of how to transform the situation from within so to speak. They do not seem to perceive 
any chance of changing the currently hegemonic disempowering efficacy of the DNTs for the 
better, or at least they do not make any effort in theorizing such a possibility. This might be 
explained from the fact that they both lack a theory of human-technology interaction and of 
technological change. Neither do they possess any conception of a technopolitics.   
 
Andrew Feenberg, in a thoughtful and balanced article on the question of the Internet, responds to 
Dean’s all-too critical media theory, in his opinion, by resolutely defending the democratic and 
emancipatory potential of DNTs and by accusing Dean’s rather bleak analysis of them of being 
too reductive, highlighting only some aspects of the Internet while disregarding others that are 
less disempowering and more promising for democratization. Although still a Marxist of sorts, 
Feenberg does not theorize the Internet from the perspective of the class struggle, like Dean and 
Berardi. His concern as a critical theorist of technology is democratic participation and he affirms 
that the bottom-up communication and cooperation afforded by the Internet unmistakably has 
emancipatory potential and efficacy. He sees no evidence for Dean’s claim that the widespread 
use of DNTs is responsible for the decline of political resistance and action. For Feenberg, who 
has a theory of technological change as well as an elaborate notion of technopolitics, the Internet 
shares with all other technologies the characteristic of being ambivalent and essentially contested 
and therefore contestable. It is a terrain of struggle among social actors contending for control of 
its technical code, the two most important contenders nowadays being businesses on the one hand 
and publicly engaged actors on the other, the former preferring a consumption model, the latter 
striving for a community model of online communication and interaction. Neither model has, so 
far, succeeded in achieving total victory. While not dismissive of Dean’s criticisms perse, 
Feenberg argues that many online communities do engage successfully in both conventional and 
non-conventional forms of politics, medical patients collectively using the Internet for actively 
influencing research agendas being a prominent example. What is more, Feenberg argues, the 
Internet is still in its infancy and its potentials are therefore still to be explored and struggled for. 
He then goes on saying that we actually still don’t know what the Internet is, because it will only 
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be that what it will become through social struggle. Through a technopolitical analysis of the 
various layers constitutive of the Internet, one that I cannot replicate here, Feenberg shows that 
there is plenty of possibility for emancipatory action. None of the layers that he distinguishes 
favors either the interests of business or those of public actors with emancipatory goals. It is by 
any chance just too early to condemn the Internet, Feenberg concludes. Instead, we should 
critically engage in promoting its democratic potentials.  
 
Although I find Feenberg’s defense of the Internet convincing, I nevertheless think that he 
underestimates in particular the phenomena of capture and exhaustion that are diagnosed by 
Dean, and even more emphatically by Berardi. This, I would not say blindness but lack of 
attention to these libidinal aspects of our increasingly digital and digitized lives may be explained 
by the fact that Feenberg, although a student of Herbert Marcuse, does not have a libidinal 
perspective on human-technology interaction. What is more, although always emphasizing that 
humans are technical beings and that humans and technology co-construct each-other as it were, 
his understanding of this co-construction is largely sociological and never addresses the more 
intimate, psychological and cognitive dimensions of this co-construction, if one may put it like 
that. Such a view might consider the fact how DNTs intimately, and that is to say ultimately on a 
neurological level, affect our psychic and cognitive apparatuses, i.e., the way we think, feel, 
perceive and desire. It is such a view that is provided by the organological approach towards 
technological change put forward by Bernard Stiegler, whose analysis of DNTs I want to briefly 
touch upon now. 
 
For Stiegler, the DNTs represent nothing less than an epochal technological transmutation, that is 
to say a mnemotechnological transmutation no less decisive and disruptive than the invention of 
writing at the dawn of Western civilization and printing at the dawn of modernity. It represents a 
new, that is to say third phase in what the French linguist Sylvain Auroux calls grammatization as 
the process of formalization and externalization of human language, the two earlier phases being 
that of alphabetization and writing. As such, DNTs usher in a wholly new episteme in the sense 
of Michel Foucault and allow for totally new epistemologies in the sense of Gaston Bachelard. 
They will totally reconfigure the human mindset, like writing has done in ancient Greece at the 
time of Plato, as classicists like Ong, Goody and Havelock have shown, or what printing did from 
the early fifteenth century onwards, as Elisabeth Eisenstein has pointed out. They are also on the 
way of reconfiguring our neuronal structures, changing our brain structure, as neurologist and 
psycholinguist Maryanne Wolf has argued, from ‘reading brains’ to ‘digital brains’, just like 
writing turned the ‘oral brains’ of our pre-literate ancestors into ‘reading brains’. More directly, 
they also furnish a new political organology that has yet to be a ‘appropriated’ politically.  
 
As I said, Stiegler has developed an organological theory of human-technology and society 
interaction, which I will sketch very briefly here. His general organology conceives of human 
evolution and history as technogenic processes involving three organ systems: (1) psychosomatic 
organs, (2) social organizations and (3) technical organs. Changes in the technical organs always 
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induce de-functionalizations and re-functionalizations in the psychosomatic and social organs, 
which – in the course of evolution and later during history – are involved in a constant process of 
adoption of (or adaptation to) new technologies. The relations between these three organ systems 
are of a transductive nature, meaning that they only take shape within and out of their relation to 
each other. What is most important in the current context is that the relations between these three 
organ systems constitute circuits of desire, of libidinal energy, given that the technical organs and 
the social organizations give shape to the drives residing in the psychosomatic organs. Now, the 
technical organs, Stiegler argues, can both intensify the binding of drives into libidinal energy, 
supporting processes of sublimation and psychic elevation, and cause their decomposition, which 
leads to desublimation and psychic regression. As such, every organology constitutes a libidinal 
economy. A political organology would consider the conditioning effects of the technical organs, 
or in other words the technical milieu, on the formation of political affects, most importantly on 
what Aristotle in his political writings called philia, or collective desire, as the conditio sine qua 
non of all political life. 
 
Now, for Stiegler, the fact that technical organs, i.e., technologies of all sorts but most explicitly 
so-called mnemo- or psychotechnologies, can both positively and negatively condition libidinal 
economies, is related to the fact that they are what he calls pharmaka, a Greek word that means 
both poison and medicine. As compensations for the ‘original lack’ of attributes characteristic of 
human beings, technical pharmaka can both aid and impede, both support and undermine aspects 
of those beings. They are both toxifying and curative and as constitutive for the human being’s 
thrown and projective being-in-the-world they have an autonomizing as well as a heteronomizing 
potential. This pharmacological conception of technologies has affinities with Feenberg’s idea of 
technical ambiguity but is more firmly rooted in an anthropological understanding of what the 
human life form as a technical life form is. As instruments for political subjectivation, technical 
pharmaka like DNTs can both support politicization and depoliticization, both emancipation and 
docilization. They can both elevate and ‘dumb down’ collective intelligence by supporting either 
short circuits (‘egoistic’ circuits of drive) or long circuits of individuation (producing desire and 
sociality). What DNTs ‘are’, and here Stiegler is in agreement with Feenberg, depends to a large 
extent on how they are adopted by individuals and collectives. It may be argued that Dean’s and 
Berardi’s diagnoses exclusively emphasize the proliferation of short circuits that exhaust libidinal 
energy and induce drive-based behavior, thereby acknowledging only the toxic tendency and 
disregarding or at least neglecting any thought of a therapy that would precisely be based on an 
emancipatory and autonomizing adoption or appropriation of DNTs that would counter its toxic, 
heteronomizing tendencies. Stiegler stresses that autonomy exists only in an intimate relation 
with technical heteronomy, on the condition, that is, that it is adopted intelligently, reflexively 
and with care, which assumes a practice, that is to say a therapy, a sociotherapy, or in short: a 
politics. DNT’s, as Stiegler persistently argues again and again in all of his writings, can truly 
function as a technical milieu creating long circuits and supporting a new social autonomy. This 
presupposes, however, a collective appropriation of that milieu to become an associated milieu 
instead of a dissociated milieu, which is the dominant situation today. In fact, DNTs are ideally 
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suited for this, certainly so if compared to the older analog, Hertzian-based information and 
communication technologies like radio and television. To give some idea of that: DNT’s are 
characterized by delinearity, which allows for demassification and desynchronized access (think 
of podcasts for instance), by annotability, which allows for tagging and the bottom-up creation of 
metadata, hypermediality, which means that it can handle all levels of grammatization, from texts 
to genomic sequences and most importantly bidirectionality, which allows receivers to be senders 
and vice versa.  
 
Stiegler’s assessment of the current impact on the general intellect of DNTs, however, is more 
close to the views of Dean and Berardi than to those of Hardt and Negri, for instance. And at first 
sight, he also seems much more ‘pessimistic’ with regard to the Internet than Feenberg, but this is 
only apparently so. In fact, the DNTs are for Stiegler nothing less than the way out of the state of 
deep intoxication of our current mnemotechnical milieu suffers from as a result of its annexation 
by consumerist and cultural capitalism. It sometimes even looks as if DNTs represent, for him, a 
kind of Heideggerian saving power, if only we were able to succeed in carrying through what he 
has referred to once as a ‘pharmacological turn’ of this pharmakon. Concurring with the analyses 
of Dean and Berardi and fundamentally disagreeing with the views of Hardt and Negri, Stiegler 
contends that instead of tendentially autonomizing and empowering the multitude because of the 
increasing independence of the general intellect from capitalist control, in reality the general 
intellect appears to be the object of an intense process of proletarianization today that seems to 
disempower it and rob it of its autonomy, producing a regression of the collective intelligence of 
the general intellect that he refers to as a state of ‘systemic stupidity’. Instead of fixed capital 
migrating to living labor, thereby granting it more autonomy as Hardt and Negri claim, Stiegler 
states that through generalized automation as exteriorization and short-circuiting of psychic and 
cognitive functions in the DNT, we cannot but admit that the multitude’s collective intelligence is 
becoming increasingly proletarianized. Instead of a growing commonization and autonomization 
of the multitude, what seems to be the rule nowadays is cognitive proletarianization and psychic 
heteronomization of the singularities that make up the multitude. So-called cognitive capitalism 
in fact destroys cognition, forcing workers to adapt their cognitive apparatus and capacities to a 
digital technical milieu that imposes the imperatives of profit and competition. It is true that 
DNTs enable the ‘cooperation between brains’ (Lazzarato) but so far they have predominantly 
served capital in controlling this cooperation and capturing its fruits.  
 
However, this is a pharmacological situation and as such it is anything but hopeless. While still 
functioning largely as technologies of capture and control (as analyzed by Dean and Berardi), at 
the same time the DNTs are gradually beginning to be transformed into the conditions for the 
emergence of a wholly new associated milieu than can function as the support of a therapeutic 
countermovement that can fight the proletarianizing tendency. Phenomena like Free Software, 
peer-to-peer, Wikipedia, Wikileaks, Anonymous, and many other commons-based collaborative 
projects can be understood as being the first movements in that direction, movements that are 
characterized by Stiegler in terms of deproletarianization. The hackers and their anti-protestant – 
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although not necessarily anti-capitalist – ethics of voluntary cooperation, sharing, passion and 
care with respect to digital work (as expounded by Pekka Himanen in his well-known bestseller 
The Hacker Ethic) are the exemplary heroes of this countermovement.  
 
What is lacking in Stiegler, however, is a class based analysis of this pharmacological situation in 
terms of an account of the possibilities for recomposition of the general intellect. Such an account 
should be developed, I claim, because it seems unrealistic if not totally illusory, as Stiegler does 
in his writings, to put too much trust in the initiative of governments or representatives of today’s 
public institutions, to promote and support the emergence of alternative modes of production and 
collaboration beyond the consumerist model and that can break with the current hegemony. In an 
all-out class war of capital and the state against the laboring multitudes, which is currently waged 
with an unprecedented brutality and cynicism, calling for a public power to positively intervene 
in the situation and prescribe a sociotherapy in terms of a positive pharmacology is truly beyond 
naivety. Such a therapy should and can only emerge from ‘below’, from the multitude itself, or 
more realistically from its dissident and least proletarianized factions.   
 
Unfortunately, I did not have the time to embark on a compositionalist pharmacological analysis 
of today’s DNTs. And for that reason, I will necessarily have to limit myself here to proposing a 
few questions that could guide such an analysis. It is clear that DNTs by themselves, left within 
the confines of the market economy, will never bring about true social autonomy but will only 
enforce the toxic, desublimatory, heteronomizing tendency that Dean, Berardi and also Stiegler 
rightly diagnose. What is needed is a political project of adoption in terms of a therapy and this 
‘therapy’ must intervene at a systemic level and aim for a new organization of society, no less! A 
society that would be truly intelligent and autonomous in the ideal sense that it, as André Gorz 
has put it nicely in one of his books, paraphrasing a famous dictum by Karl Marx, should create 
the conditions ‘in which the full development of each person’s ability is everyone’s aim’ (109) 
and in which production would serve human development instead of human development serving 
the production of surplus value (113). In light of the critical diagnoses offered by Dean, Berardi 
and Stiegler, the following questions could lead a pharmacological analysis of class composition 
in the current situation: how can we employ the digital pharmakon itself against the hegemonic 
tendencies it now supports? How can DNTs be appropriated or maybe newly designed so that 
they can be used to struggle against the constant acceleration of online, and as a consequence also 
of offline life, that they now everywhere support? How can the digital pharmaka be changed so 
as to slow down life and shape the conditions and the time for reflection, critique and a more free 
and autonomous disposition of our individual and collective time? How can the digital pharmaka 
be changed so as to foster community and solidarity instead of atomizing us? How can we change 
the underlying algorithms – the technical codes so to speak – that constitute the technofinancial 
automatisms Berardi writes about? How can the digital pharmaka be appropriated or redesigned 
so as to become the supportive technologies of what Stiegler has called an ‘otium of the people’, 
i.e., as technologies of the self and others, of care of the self and care of the other in the sense of  
Michel Foucault, instead of promoting competition and leading to an increasing automation, 
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heteronomization and carelessness? How can these pharmaka be creatively re-appropriated to 
struggle against the disaffection and libidinal exhaustion and how can they become the supports 
of new modes of critical and ‘deep’ attention? How can they become supports of processes of 
commonization and the formation of ‘collective desire for the collective’, instead of increasing 
individualization? How can they reconnect subjects with the social body they are part of yet 
hardly experience anymore?  
 
All these questions, which need to be elaborated, suppose that we should not only learn the ‘art of 
living with ICT’, as the title of this symposium proposes, but that we should also learn to fight, to 
produce, to commonize and to live together with ICT. ‘Living with ICT’ in my ears sounded a bit 
too sad actually, like the necessity of having to cope with something, of having to get along with 
it, of having to adapt ourselves to it, whereas instead we should adapt those technologies to what 
we, as socio-technical creatures, collectively decide to be a life worth living. That is the ultimate 
question, I guess, with respect to the question of the art of ‘living with ICTs’. 
 
Thank you very much for your attention and my apologies for somewhat exceeding my time 
limit! 
